Abstract-The classical wiretap channel models secure communication in the presence of a nonlegitimate wiretapper who has to be kept ignorant. Traditionally, the wiretapper is passive in the sense that he only tries to eavesdrop the communication using his received channel output. In this paper, more powerful active wiretappers are studied. In addition to eavesdropping, these wiretap- 
I. INTRODUCTION

R
APID developments in communication systems make information available almost everywhere. Along with this, the security of sensitive information from unauthorized access becomes an important task and a common approach is the use of cryptographic techniques to keep information secret. Such techniques have a wide variety of use and are based on the assumption of insufficient computational capabilities of nonlegitimate receivers. Due to the increase in computational power, improved algorithms, and recent advances in number theory, these techniques are becoming more and more insecure. Wireless communication systems are inherently vulnerable for eavesdropping due to the open nature of the wireless medium. The physical properties of the wireless channel make the communication easily accessible to external wiretappers but, on the other hand, also offer possibilities to establish security by other approaches than cryptographic techniques.
In this context, the concept of information theoretic, or physical layer, security is becoming more and more attractive, since it solely uses the physical properties of the wireless channel in order to establish security. Information theoretic security was initiated by Wyner, who introduced the wiretap channel [1] . This is the simplest scenario involving security with one legitimate transmitter-receiver pair and one wiretapper to be kept ignorant. Recently, there is growing interest in information theoretic security as it provides a promising approach to embed secure communication in wireless networks; for instance see [2] - [5] and references therein. Along with this, the concept of physical layer service integration becomes more and more important [6] .
All these previous studies have one thing in common: the wiretapper is usually assumed to be passive in the sense that he (or she) simply tries to eavesdrop upon the communication and to infer the confidential information by only using his received channel output. This scenario is briefly reviewed in Section II. In contrast to that, we consider in this paper more powerful wiretappers which are able to maliciously influence the channel conditions of all users. Since legitimate transmitter and receiver have no knowledge about how such an active wiretapper will influence the channel conditions, they have to be prepared for the worst, i.e., a channel which may vary in an unknown and arbitrary manner from channel use to channel use.
The concept of arbitrarily varying channels (AVC) [7] - [9] is a suitable model to capture the effects of such unknown varying channel conditions. Accordingly, the communication problem at hand is given by the corresponding arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) with active wiretapper, which is introduced in Section III.
In the context of AVCs, it has been shown that common randomness (CR) is an important and often necessary resource for reliable communication over arbitrarily varying channels [7] - [9] . The availability of common randomness allows legitimate users to use more sophisticated, CR-assisted strategies by coordinating their choice of encoder and decoder. But it also paves the way for more powerful wiretappers. An active wiretapper may or may not exploit the available common randomness for controlling the channel states.
Thus, this immediately defines different classes of attacks against which the communication should be protected. Section IV deals with active wiretappers who do not exploit available common randomness. First studies for the corresponding AVWC with active wiretapper can be found in [10] , [11] , where the latter use the strong secrecy criterion [12] , [13] . In this paper, the main objective is the analysis of active wiretappers exploiting CR. This is done in Section V where the corresponding CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR is analyzed in detail.
For wireless communication systems, it is important to understand how the overall performance of the system is determined. For example, the capacity of an OFDM system is given by the sum of the capacities of all subchannels. In particular, if two useless channels with zero capacity are used in an orthogonal way, the overall capacity of the system is still zero. In Section VI we use the previously developed theory to show that two orthogonal AVWCs, each useless for themselves in the sense that it has zero secrecy capacity, can be used together to super-activate the whole system to allow for secure communication at positive secrecy rates. This shows that the world view of classical additivity of orthogonal resources does not hold anymore (in the sense that " ") if secrecy requirements are imposed. We note that such phenomena as the aforementioned super-activation only appear for active wiretappers and are not possible for passive wiretappers. Until now, such effects have been observed only for quantum communication systems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first example that the phenomenon of super-activation is observed for classical communication systems as well. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion in Section VII.
Notation
Discrete random variables are denoted by capital letters and their realizations and ranges by lower case and script letters; and are the sets of positive integers and nonnegative real numbers; and are the mutual information and the binary entropy; denotes a Markov chain of random variables , and in this order; all logarithms, exponentials, and information quantities are taken to the base 2;
is the set of all probability distributions and is the complement of a set; and denote the expectation and probability; assigns the value of the right hand side (rhs) to the left hand side (lhs).
II. CLASSICAL WIRETAP CHANNEL
First, we briefly state the key ideas and main results for the classical wiretap channel. In this scenario, the wiretapper is assumed to be passive in the sense that he simply tries to eavesdrop upon the communication and to infer the confidential information by using only its received channel output.
Therefore we start with some basic definitions. Let and be finite input and output sets. Then the channels and represent the communication links to the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper. For input and output sequences and of block length , the discrete memoryless channels are given by and . The wiretap channel with passive wiretapper is given by the pair of channels with common input. 1 The task is now to establish a reliable communication between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver and, at the same time, to keep the confidential information secret from the passive wiretapper. This is formalized as follows.
Definition 1: An -code for the wiretap channel consists of a stochastic encoder (1) i.e., a stochastic matrix, with a set of messages and a decoder given by a collection of disjoint decoding sets Then for an -code , the average probability of decoding error at the legitimate receiver is given by . To keep the message secret from the wiretapper, we further require for some (small) with the random variable uniformly distributed over the set of messages and the channel output at the wiretapper. This criterion is known as strong secrecy [12] , [13] .
Definition 2: A nonnegative number is an achievable secrecy rate for the wiretap channel with passive wiretapper if for all there is an and a sequence -codes such that for all we have and and while as . The secrecy capacity is given by the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates . The discrete memoryless wiretap channel with passive wiretapper is well studied under several aspects and its secrecy capacity can be found for instance in [1] , [12] - [14] .
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with passive wiretapper is where the random variables form a Markov chain.
Remark 1: For the wiretap channel it turns out that stochastic encoding, cf. (1) , is crucial to keep the wiretapper ignorant of the transmitted message and, therefore, to achieve the secrecy capacity. This is in contrast to the point-to-point link without any secrecy requirements, where deterministic encoding suffices to achieve the capacity. 1 Note that it is sufficient to consider the marginal transition probabilities and only as the secrecy capacity depends only the marginal channels to the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper. In particular, two wiretap channels with different joint probability distributions and have the same secrecy capacity if they have the same marginal probability distributions and , cf. [2, Lemma 2.1].
III. ARBITRARILY VARYING WIRETAP CHANNELS
A passive wiretapper does not influence the channel conditions of the legitimate users and, accordingly, simply tries to eavesdrop upon the communication. In contrast to that, we consider in this paper more powerful wiretappers which are further able to control the channel states of all users. To model such an active wiretapper, we introduce a function , where characterizes a certain strategy and denotes the set of all possible active strategies of the wiretapper.
Since the legitimate users have no knowledge about how the active wiretapper will choose his strategy and, thus, how he will influence the channel conditions, they have to be prepared for the worst, i.e., a channel which may vary in an unknown and arbitrary manner from channel use to channel use.
A. Arbitrarily Varying Channels as a Model for Active Wiretappers
The concept of arbitrarily varying channels [7] - [9] is a suitable model to capture the aforementioned effects. To model the unknown varying channel states, we introduce a finite state set . Then the communication links to the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper are given by and respectively. For given state sequence of length , the discrete memoryless channel to the legitimate receiver is given by (2) for all and . Then the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) to the legitimate receiver is given by the family of channels for all state sequences , i.e.,
Further, for any probability distribution we define the averaged channel to the legitimate receiver as (4) Similarly, for the channel to the wiretapper, we define for given state sequence the discrete memoryless channel as for all and , and, accordingly, and for . Definition 3: The arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) with active wiretapper is given by the families of pairs of channels with common input as In contrast to the classical wiretap channel with passive wiretapper, cf. Section II, we have to take the unknown varying channel states into account for establishing the communication. Therefore, the probability of decoding error slightly changes as follows. Using the wiretap code from Definition 1, the probability of decoding error at the legitimate receiver for message and state sequence is given by and the average probability of error for state sequence is
We further define the maximum as (5) To ensure that the transmitted message is kept secret from the wiretapper for all state sequences , we now require (6) where denotes the output at the wiretapper for state sequence . The communication over the AVWC with active wiretapper is visualized in Fig. 1 is chosen according to an underlying distribution nor the distribution itself is known. Thus, it is required to find codes such that and as for all simultaneously. This means the codes have to be universal with respect to the state sequences, which is also reflected by the maximum in (5) and (6) .
B. Impact of Common Randomness
It has been shown that common randomness (CR) is an important resource for reliable communication over arbitrarily varying channels. Therefore we first briefly review the impact of available CR for the classical single-user AVC and then discuss how it affects communication strategies for the corresponding AVWC.
For the single-user AVC as given (3), it has been shown that its capacity highly depends on the coordination between encoder and decoder [7] - [9] . As shown in Fig. 2 , there is the deterministic approach with prespecified encoder and decoder, and further the CR-assisted approach, where encoder and decoder are coordinated based on an access to a common random source. The latter strategy leads to the CR-assisted capacity of the AVC which is given by [7] Fig. 1. Arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) with active wiretapper. The wiretapper controls the channel conditions by choosing a corresponding state sequence based on his strategy . The actual sequence is unknown to both sender and legitimate receiver. The sender encodes a message into the codeword and transmits it over the AVWC to the legitimate receiver, which has to decode the message for any state sequence . At the same time, the wiretapper has to be kept ignorant of in the sense that .
where denotes the random variable associated with the output of the averaged channel for , cf. (4). For the deterministic capacity it has been shown that it displays a dichotomy behavior: it either equals the CR-assisted capacity or otherwise is zero [8] . This can be characterized in detail using the concept of symmetrizability [9] .
Definition 5: An AVC is called symmetrizable if there exists a stochastic matrix such that (7) holds for all and . Roughly speaking, Definition 5 means that a symmetrizable AVC can "emulate" a valid input, which makes it impossible for the decoder to decide on the correct codeword. With this, the deterministic capacity can be completely characterized as follows. If the AVC is nonsymmetrizable, we have
In addition, we have if and only if the AVC is symmetrizable [9] .
C. CR-Assisted Strategies
The previous discussion shows that common randomness is a necessary and important resource for reliable communication under arbitrarily varying channel conditions; in particular, if the channel is symmetrizable. Therefore, we assume in the following that all parties, i.e., the legitimate users and the active wiretapper, have access to a common randomness which we denote by . This assumption can be motivated by the fact that this is realized over a public channel which is open to the wiretapper.
Remark 3: If the wiretapper has no access to the common randomness, the legitimate users can immediately use this resource to create a secret key corresponding to the size of the common randomness and therewith keep the confidential information completely secret from the wiretapper.
The legitimate users can use common randomness as a resource to coordinate their choice of encoder and decoder. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 6: A CR-assisted -code for the AVWC with active wiretapper is given by a family of wiretap codes together with a random variable taking values in according to . Using the CR-assisted code , the mean average probability of error at the legitimate receiver for state sequence is then given by , i.e.,
and, accordingly, the maximum by . The definitions of a CR-assisted achievable secrecy rate and the corresponding CR-assisted secrecy capacity are defined accordingly by replacing the code by in Definition 4.
Definition 7: A nonnegative number is a CR-assisted achievable secrecy rate for the AVWC with active wiretapper if for all there is an and a sequence of -codes such that for all we have and (9) and while as . Here, is the expectation over the whole ensemble of codebooks, where is the mutual information term for the particular code , cf. (6). The CR-assisted secrecy capacity is given by the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates . Common randomness allows the legitimate users to use more sophisticated strategies, but it also has an impact on the behavior and on the abilities of potential wiretappers. In particular, an active wiretapper might or might not exploit the knowledge about the common randomness for influencing the channel states. These two cases are further analyzed in the following.
IV. ACTIVE WIRETAPPERS
We start with the case where the active wiretapper does not exploit his knowledge about the common randomness. Thus, his particular choice of does not depend on the observation . The corresponding communication scenario is visualized in Fig. 3 and first studies can be found in [11] for the strong secrecy criterion.
A. CR-Assisted Secrecy Capacity
For the CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper, there are only partial results known. For this, we need the following definition. (10) where and denote the random variables associated with the outputs of the corresponding averaged channels and .
B. Secrecy Capacity
A CR-assisted strategy requires common randomness between all users, since encoder and decoders depend all on the same observation of the common random experiment, cf. Definition 6. If this kind of resource is not available, a strategy with prespecified encoder and decoder is needed. For the characterization of the corresponding secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper, a concept of symmetrizability is needed, similarly as for the single-user AVC, cf. Definition 5 and [9] . For deterministic encoding, there is a one-to-one mapping between the message and the corresponding codeword . Therefore, a symmetrizability concept on the "codeword level" as in (7) suffices to characterize the deterministic capacity of the classical AVC without any secrecy requirements [8] , [9] . On the other hand, in the context of information theoretic secrecy, it has been shown that randomized encoding is indispensable, cf. also Remark 1, which precludes a deterministic one-to-one mapping. Therefore, for the analysis of the AVWC with active wiretapper, there is the need of a more sophisticated definition of symmetrizability on the "message level" which takes randomized encoding into account. This was done in [11] in a more implicit way. Here, we present the corresponding definition and analysis in detail, which will be needed to analyze the case when , cf. also Lemma 1 and Theorem 2. For this purpose, we define (11) holds for all and . Note that due to the secrecy requirement, we need the general concept of randomized encoding. This concept is more powerful than deterministic encoding as it includes deterministic encoding as a special case. The important thing is that this necessitates a more general concept of symmetrizability as given in (11) which is a multiletter description for all block lengths . This is in contrast to the single-user AVC with deterministic encoding for which a single-letter description of symmetrizability is sufficient, cf. (7). Now the crucial observation is the following. If an AVC is symmetrizable in the sense of Definition 5, cf. (7), then it is also symmetrizable under randomized encoding, cf. Definition 9.
Lemma 1: Let the AVC be symmetrizable in the sense of Definition 5, i.e., there is a stochastic matrix such that (7) holds. Then the AVC is also symmetrizable under stochastic encoding, i.e., there exists a stochastic matrix such that for any stochastic encoder condition (11) holds. Proof: Let be the stochastic encoder. We set as shown at the bottom of the page. For any with we have the second equation shown at the bottom of the page, where the third equality follows from the symmetrizability, cf. (7) .
With this we immediately obtain a similar result for randomized encoding as in [9 (12) where the second step follows from the symmetrizability under randomized encoding, cf. (11) . With this, we get for the probability of error where the second step follows from (12) and the last step from . This immediately implies for the average probability of error so that for some . Finally, with the desired result is proved. This shows that a symmetrizable AVC leads to a probability of decoding error at the receiver which satisfies also under randomized encoding. The consequence is that also under randomized encoding, there is no communication possible if the AVC is symmetrizable. Accordingly, the capacity for randomized encoding is zero and therewith also for the secrecy capacity of the corresponding AVWC with active wiretapper. Thus, in this case the active wiretapper can choose a strategy so that the state sequence can emulate a valid input which causes ambiguities at the legitimate receiver.
On the other hand, if the AVC is nonsymmetrizable, we have for the deterministic capacity , and so we have for randomized encoding. Accordingly, this allows us to characterize the behavior of the secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper in detail. To this end, we drop the assumption of a best channel to the wiretapper for a moment. Remark 4: Interestingly, the secrecy capacity is not longer characterized by entropic quantities. Although the mutual information terms and their differences, cf. (10), might be positive, the secrecy capacity is still zero if the corresponding AVC is symmetrizable.
V. ACTIVE WIRETAPPERS EXPLOITING CR
In this case, the active wiretapper is more powerful as he exploits his knowledge about the common randomness to maliciously influence the channel conditions of the legitimate users. Accordingly, the wiretapper can choose his strategy based on the outcome of the random experiment. To emphasize this dependency, we denote the set of all strategies by in the following. Now, the function representing his strategy becomes (13) This means, for every observation , the wiretapper can choose the state sequence which governs the following transmission. Of course, the actual strategy of the wiretapper is unknown to the legitimate users. The corresponding communication scenario is depicted in Fig. 4 .
Then the definitions of a CR-assisted achievable secrecy rate and the CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR are defined accordingly by letting the state sequence in (8) and (9) in Definitions 6 and 7 be . With this, for function the probability of decoding error at the legitimate receiver becomes (14) and, accordingly,
The mean secrecy criterion becomes (16) Conditions (14) and (16) show that an active wiretapper exploiting CR has different strategies, since (14) and (16) depend on the applied strategy . On the one hand, he can try to maximize the information leaked to him by choosing the state sequence such that (16) is maximized. Another strategy is to disturb the communication of the legitimate users by choosing the state sequence such that the probability of decoding error is maximized. Thus, it includes jamming models where the wiretapper acts as a jammer. Of course, any combination in between is also a valid strategy for the wiretapper and, thus, the legitimate users have to be prepared for all possible strategies which is reflected by the maximum in (15) and (16) .
A. CR-Assisted Secrecy Capacity
In the following we will solve this problem and further characterize the optimal strategy of the wiretapper. This yields a complete characterization of the CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR. : it either equals its CR-assisted secrecy capacity (not exploiting CR) or else is zero. As a consequence, the characterization of is again nonentropic, cf. also Remark 4. Thus, with the result given in Theorem 2 we immediately obtain the following characterization of the CR-assisted secrecy capacity.
Corollary 1:
The CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR is given by Remark 5: For the dichotomy result above we assumed . For the case , we trivially have equality since . In the following we prove Theorem 3. To do so, we start with a basic observation which yields a trivial upper bound on . Since an active wiretapper exploiting CR is more powerful than an active wiretapper which does not exploit CR, we immediately obtain (17) For the proof it turns out to be beneficial distinguishing between and . The corresponding proofs are carried out in the following two subsections.
B. Positive CR-Assisted Secrecy Capacity
First, we study the case, where the CR-assisted secrecy capacity is positive. We show that if , we actually have equality in (17), i.e., .
Theorem 4: If , then
Proof: To prove the desired result, we extend techniques for the ordinary AVC; more precisely the random code reduction [8] , [11] and the elimination of randomness [8] . We have to extend and generalize these techniques in order to incorporate the secrecy requirement on the transmitted message and to include active wiretappers which exploit CR.
1) Random Code Reduction: Let , and be arbitrary. Now, we start with a CR-assisted -code for the AVWC with active wiretapper (not exploiting CR), cf. Definition 6, which is optimal in the sense that it achieves the secrecy rate with and So far we cannot say anything about the common randomness that is needed for this code to be optimal, especially the size can be arbitrary large. But from the random code reduction in [11] we can conclude on the following. for all . Lemma 3 shows that for any CR-assisted code for the AVWC with active wiretapper, there exists another "reduced" CR-assisted code uniformly distributed over wiretap codes with an average probability of error and a mean secrecy criterion which fulfill (19).
Furthermore, from Lemma 3, cf. also [11] , we see that it is sufficient to select no more than wiretap codes to obtain a CR-assisted code with the desired properties achieving the same secrecy rate as the original code . Up to now we have ensured that there is a CR-assisted code consisting of polynomial many wiretap codes for the AVWC with active wiretapper (not exploiting CR) with the desired properties. The next step is to make this code suitable for the case with an active wiretapper, which exploits CR, as well.
2) Elimination of Randomness:
The crucial idea is to combine the reduced CR-assisted code with a code suitable for the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR. Since , there exists such a code which achieves positive secrecy rate and, thus, such a code is suitable to indicate which element of is actually used in the following. In more detail, since , there exists a CR-assisted code for the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR consisting of a family with stochastic encoders and collections of disjoint decoding sets with as with probability of error and further for all with as . Now, the final code for the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR is given by the composition of both codes and . Thus, the final code consists of encoders transmitting a message from of length , and decoding sets , where the channel is determined by the state sequence . Since as , the resources "wasted" for indicating which code is actually used, vanishes so that we end up with completing the proof. Note that Lemma 3 ensures that the ratio vanishes by letting be of polynomial size only (since it is of order ). 3) Discussion: Theorem 4 shows that if the CR-assisted secrecy capacity is positive, an active wiretapper exploiting CR is as (in)effective as an active wiretapper who does not exploit CR. Thus, a strategy which maximizes the information leakage to the wiretapper, cf. (16), does not make sense in this case. Thus, the optimal strategy of an active wiretapper exploiting CR must be to destroy the communication of the legitimate users. This means, the aim must be to choose the state sequence in such a way that the probability of error of the legitimate users in (14) is maximized. Then the CR-assisted secrecy capacity becomes zero, i.e.,
. Since otherwise, we have , which means that the legitimate users can operate at the same rate as if the active wiretapper would not exploit CR.
C. Zero CR-Assisted Secrecy Capacity
The previous analysis shows that if then . Thus, the strategy of an active wiretapper exploiting CR must be to destroy the communication of the legitimate users. Therefore, we study now the case, where the CR-assisted secrecy capacity is zero. If , we immediately obtain from (17) that as well. Therefore, it remains to concentrate on in the following. Next, we show that for , we have if and only if the AVC to the legitimate receiver is symmetrizable. We start with the direct part, which establishes symmetrizability as a necessary condition for . Lemma 4: Let . If then the AVC to the legitimate receiver is symmetrizable. Proof: We prove the proposition by contradiction. Therefore we assume the AVC to be nonsymmetrizable. Then we know from [11] that the secrecy capacity and the CR-assisted secrecy capacity are equal, i.e., . This means that there exists a wiretap code which achieves the desired rate. Such a code can be considered as a special CR-assisted code with cardinality . The consequence is that, basically, the active wiretapper which exploits CR "becomes" an active wiretapper which does not exploit CR since his knowledge about the common randomness is useless. Thus, we end up with which contradicts the assumption. This establishes symmetrizability as a necessary condition for . The next lemma shows that if the AVC to the legitimate receiver is symmetrizable, then the average probability of decoding error (14) is strictly positive which implies . Thus, it establishes symmetrizability also as a sufficient condition for . For this purpose, for strategy of the active wiretapper exploiting CR we define This means is a stochastic matrix and we obtain for any with and any the following where the third equality follows from the fact the AVC is symmetrizable. This proves (21) and therewith completes the proof of the theorem.
D. Capacity Results
The AVWC with an active wiretapper, who is not exploiting CR, is studied in [11] . There, several capacity results are derived for the approach with prespecified encoder and decoder as well as for the CR-assisted approach where encoder and decoder are coordinated with the help of a common random source. In the following we will show that the results derived in this paper for the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR, cf. Section V, allow to obtain similar capacity results.
In particular, if , from the achievable secrecy rate for the AVWC with active wiretapper, cf. Proposition 1 and Theorem 4, we immediately obtain also an achievable secrecy rate for the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR.
Corollary 2: If and if there exists a best channel to the wiretapper, then for of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR it holds that where and denote the outputs of the corresponding channels and . Since an active wiretapper, who is exploiting CR, is more powerful than a wiretapper who is not, we have , cf. (17), so that every upper bound the CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper immediately yields also an upper bound on the CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR. Thus, (17) and [11, Theorem 3] yield the following upper bound on the CR-assisted secrecy capacity.
Proposition 2: The CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR is bounded from above by Such a worst case assumption yields a very natural upper bound, since the CR-assisted secrecy capacity cannot exceed the capacities of each individual channel realization. Thus, this upper bound is dominated by the worst channel to the legitimate receiver and the best channel to the wiretapper. However, this bound is in general not tight. In addition, we obtain from [11, Theorem 4] a multiletter upper bound on the CR-assisted secrecy capacity.
Proposition 3: The CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR is bounded from above by where and the outputs of the channels and . Now, applying the achievability result given in Corollary 2 to the -fold product of the channels and , we obtain together with the multiletter upper bound in Proposition 3 a multiletter description of the CR-assisted secrecy capacity.
Theorem 5: If and if there exists a best channel to the wiretapper, then a multiletter description of the CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR is given by if and only if the AVC to the legitimate receiver is nonsymmetrizable.
VI. SUPER-ACTIVATION
For wireless communication systems, such as cellular systems or sensor networks, resource allocation is an important issue as it determines the overall performance of the network. For example, the overall capacity of an OFDM system is given by the sum of the capacities of all orthogonal subchannels. Furthermore, a system consisting of two orthogonal AVCs, where both are "useless," i.e., with zero capacity, the capacity of the whole system is zero as well. This reflects the world view of classical additivity of basic resources in the sense that "
." In contrast to that, in quantum information theory, it has been shown recently that the classical additivity of basic resources does not hold anymore. There are examples in quantum communication, where two channels which are themselves useless allow perfect transmission if they are used together, i.e., "
," cf. for example [15] , [16] . To the best of our knowledge, such phenomena of super-activation of channels are not possible for passive wiretappers and, to date, it has been expected that they only appear in the area of quantum communication.
The natural question arises if such phenomena as super-activation, which have been observed only in the area of quantum communication until now, are also possible for classical communication systems. Such knowledge is particularly important as it has a direct impact on the design and the medium access control of communication systems.
A. Secure Communication Over Orthogonal AVWCs
In the following, we study what happens if certain secrecy requirements are imposed. We show that in this case, super-activation also appear in such classical communication systems. To do so, we consider secure communication over two orthogonal AVWCs with active wiretappers as depicted in Fig. 5 .
For finite input sets , output sets , and state sets , we define two AVWCs and exactly as in Section III, cf. especially (2)- (3) and Definition 3. Now, the parallel use of both AVWCs and results in the combined AVWC , where the notation indicates the orthogonal use of and . Then for given state sequences , the discrete memoryless channel to the legitimate receiver is with and . Accordingly, the AVC is given by and the AVWC by where is the discrete memoryless channel to the wiretapper. Next, we define two suitable AVWCs, which are themselves useless with zero secrecy capacity, and show that they lead to a positive secrecy capacity if they are used together. Therefore, we make use of an example which first appeared in [7] and which is later also discussed in [8, Example 1] . We use this example to construct the AVC to the legitimate receiver. Therefore, let and define with Further, let the AVC to the wiretapper be consisting of only one element, i.e., so that the first AVWC is given by From [7] we know that the AVC to the legitimate receiver is symmetrizable and, hence, we have and .
Since is symmetrizable, we know from Theorem 2 that the secrecy capacity is zero, i.e.,
. Since the AVC to the wiretapper consists of only one element, there obviously exists a best channel to the wiretapper so that Proposition 1 yields if is chosen accordingly. 2 Now, let us define the second AVWC . Therefore, let and and define with so that , and with so that with the binary entropy function. With this, we construct the second AVWC as Since , we obtain . Note that this provides an example for an AVWC with a nonsymmetrizable AVC to the legitimate receiver whose CR-assisted secrecy capacity is zero. 2 For example, if we choose the useless channel for and as the channel to the wiretapper, we obviously have so that .
Thus, we have constructed two AVWCs and , whose both secrecy capacities are zero, i.e.,
. In the following we denote the system which results from the parallel use of both channels by , cf. also Fig. 5 . Note that since both AVWCs are used in a orthogonal manner, we have for each AVWC encoders and decoders , according to Definitions 1 and 6 respectively.
B. Protocol for Super-Activation
Next, we argue how both channels, which are useless for secure transmission, can be used to super-activate the system to allow for secure communication at nonzero secrecy rates. The joint use of both AVWCs results in a joint encoder and a joint decoder . The corresponding communication scenario is depicted in Fig. 6 .
1) Active Wiretapper:
Here we discuss the case where the wiretapper does not exploit his access to the common randomness. In the following we show that we have although . The first observation is that , which can easily be achieved by using only so that we obviously have . The second crucial observation is the following.
Lemma 6: The combined AVC to the legitimate receiver is nonsymmetrizable.
Proof: It suffices to show that is nonsymmetrizable according to Definition 5, since then Lemma 1 immediately implies that it is also nonsymmetrizable under randomized encoding according to Definition 9. In general, to show that a parallel AVC with channels is nonsymmetrizable, we have to show that for all stochastic matrices there exists . But this contradicts the assumption of (cf. corresponding construction of the channel in Section VI-A), which proves the assertion that combined AVC is nonsymmetrizable.
Since is nonsymmetrizable, from Proposition 1 we then have . The protocol which actually achieves positive secrecy rates for the system is given as follows. To securely transmit message to the legitimate receiver, the sender first creates . To make also available at the legitimate receiver, the sender transmits over the second AVWC . Since the corresponding link to the legitimate user is nonsymmetrizable, we have and there exists decoding sets making at the legitimate receiver available. Note that as , it is very likely that will be also available at the wiretapper. Thus, for the first AVWC we are in the same situation as in Section IV, i.e., common randomness is available at the legitimate users and the wiretapper.
For the first AVWC , the legitimate users can use the common randomness created through the second AVWC to use a CR-assisted strategy. The sender transmits and the legitimate user uses decoding sets for decoding. As , secure communication at a positive secrecy rate is possible. This completes the protocol which achieves a secrecy rate .
2) Active Wiretapper Exploiting CR:
From Theorem 3 we know that the CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR displays the same behavior as the secrecy capacity . Thus, it is convincing that the super-activation discussed above also holds for active wiretappers, i.e., although we have by construction and Theorem 3.
It is clear that the protocol for naive active wiretappers as discussed above also works in the case of active wiretappers exploiting CR as briefly outlined in the following. The common randomness available at all users is useless as the wiretapper can choose his state sequence accordingly based on this resource. Therefore, similarly to the previous case, the sender uses the second AVWC to create "new" common randomness at all users. This allows proceeding as in the previous case to achieve positive secrecy rates. Note that due to the communication model, the wiretapper is not allowed to adapt his state sequence on the new common randomness. Accordingly, this shows the limitations of the used model and encourages further investigations on more general setups as discussed below in the conclusions.
However, the following observation is noteworthy. For both AVWCs and the active wiretapper exploiting CR can control the corresponding state sequences. This means, in principle, he can choose for a function and for a function . But for the parallel use he is further able to use a joint strategy so that his strategy space becomes larger. However, the wiretapper is not able to gain from his increased strategy space.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) with active wiretappers, who may or may not exploit available common randomness. It was previously shown in [11] that the secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper (not exploiting CR) displays a dichotomy behavior: it either equals its CR-assisted secrecy capacity or else is zero. The main techniques to characterize the secrecy capacity and its behavior are the random code reduction, elimination of randomness, and the concept of symmetrizability.
Here, we extended and generalized these techniques in a proper way such that imposed secrecy requirements and active wiretappers exploiting CR are incorporated. In particular, it has been shown that randomized encoding is crucial for achieving secrecy in AVWCs. This necessitated a more generalized concept of symmetrizability for randomized encoding, which is in contrast to the classical AVC (without secrecy constraints) where deterministic encoding suffices.
These generalized techniques allowed for proving that the CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR displays the same characteristic as the secrecy capacity : it either equals its CR-assisted secrecy capacity or else is zero. Interestingly, this dichotomy behavior shows that the secrecy capacity is non longer solely characterized by entropic quantities. In particular, this determines the optimal strategy of an active wiretapper. If the CR-assisted secrecy capacity is positive, it actually equals . Thus, in this case an active wiretapper exploiting CR is as (in)effective as an active wiretapper, who does not exploit available CR. Thus, the only reasonable strategy for such a wiretapper must be to symmetrize the channel to the legitimate receiver to destroy their communication. This is completely characterized using the generalized concept of symmetrizability for randomized encoding.
The techniques developed in this paper are not only powerful enough to completely characterize the CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC with active wiretapper exploiting CR, but also allow for describing new phenomena. In particular, we gave an example how two useless AVWCs, each with zero secrecy capacity, can be used together such that the system is super-activated allowing for secure transmission at nonzero secrecy rates. The super-activation in AVWCs is a consequence of the imposed secrecy requirement, since in contrast to that, for classical AVCs without secrecy requirement, super-activation is not possible to the best of our knowledge. Such results are particularly important as they give valuable insights for the design and medium access control of communication systems with secrecy requirements. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this provides the first example for nonquantum communication systems where the world view of classical additivity of basic resources does not hold anymore in the sense that "
." Although the secrecy capacities and of the AVWC are completely characterized in terms of the CR-assisted secrecy capacity (they either equals or else are zero), a precise characterization of is still missing. This is in contrast to the classical AVC (without secrecy constraint), where a single-letter characterization of the CR-assisted capacity was successfully established by linking it to a suitable compound channel [8] . On the other hand, for the AVWC it is still unknown if its CR-assisted secrecy capacity can be linked to a suitable compound wiretap channel. Only for some special cases, certain lower bounds on have been established in terms of suitable compound wiretap channels [11] . In addition, in [17] the corresponding compound wiretap channel is studied for the strong secrecy criterion and a multiletter characterization of its secrecy capacity has been established. A precise single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity has been established only for certain special cases [17] , [18] . This determines an interesting and important direction of future work.
In this paper we studied active wiretappers which were able to select the state sequence based their the access to the common randomness, i.e., for . For future work, it would be interesting to analyze what happens if the legitimate users and the wiretapper do not observe the same realization , but only correlated versions. In addition, an interesting research direction would be the study of active wiretappers with other abilities. For example, the wiretapper could be able to select the state sequence based on the previous/current received channel outputs, i.e., , with the received output sequence. Another interesting scenario would be the case in which the wiretapper and the jammer, i.e., the one who selects the state sequence, are at distinct locations, and in which the jammer (but not the wiretapper) has access to the message. This offers the possibility for the jammer to select the state sequence in such a way that it reveals more information to the wiretapper, i.e., for .
